3
and prosecute their traverse at the next assizes, a neutral course and one that could be accommodated to any decisions made by Parliament in the meanwhile." 5 For the most part, accused clergy did not suffer ejection from their livings, imprisonment or even fines.
Indeed, they were not "as far as is known constrained to read the Book of Common Prayer in their ministrations." 6 Before turning to the particular case of Hale, it is worth recapitulating the present aim: to explore the relation between issues of church, politics and law under early modern conditions of religious war and state building and, on the other hand, issues of judicial persona, legal habitus and the cultivation of a capacity for neutrality in adjudication. But judicial neutrality is not an unconditional, free-floating capacity. What the judge is neutral towards depends on something other than the law -and something other than his individual 'self'. In early modern England, judgments were made on blasphemy and witchcraft. These judgments were symptomatic of a law that operated within a political state characterised by an established national church. It is such conditions -peculiar to the contingencies of one political history -that orient and delimit the exercise of an intellectual-ethical capacity, neutrality, attaching to the judicial persona and office. The present task, then, is to retrace the interactions of this persona with the conditions in which it emerged and was more regularly occupied.
Having served on the Common Bench under Cromwell, Sir Matthew Hale returned to office under Charles II as Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer and as Chief Justice of the King's Bench (1671-6). In an important sense, Hale had to emerge from a dream: " [t] he dream that the saints could subdue the world and reshape nature was the excess and perversion of Puritanism. In more or less controlled forms, that 4 disease had troubled Hale's times." 7 As to the matter of religion, Hale stood on the side of Puritan piety coloured by a conviction of post-lapsarian humanity's limited capacities.
It was a conviction material to the cultivation of a specific persona. He thus shared the "awareness that only so much is possible within the structures provided by a working
Christian's place and opportunity; that nature is only impressible, never transformable by grace." 8 To view worldly life from this theological perspective was to clear a space for legal action. Indeed, Hale found coercive laws all the more necessary in regulating public expression of religious impulsions in circumstances where "the concerns of religion and the civil state are so twisted one with another that confusion and disorder and anarchy in the former must of necessity introduce confusion and dissolution of the latter." 9 At risk from spiritual enthusiasts was civil peace: "he that today pretends an inspiration or a divine impulse to disturb a minister in his sermon tomorrow may pretend another inspiration to take away his goods or his life." 10 In sum, Hale was eminently clear on the public dangers of religion as on the civil benefits of law.
Caught in the sectarian crossfire of his times, Hale took certain steps to guarantee some balance in his judicial work. To this end, he imposed on himself a code of conduct that included the following written resolution: that "in the execution of justice, I carefully lay aside my own passions, and not give way to them however provoked". The concern is that the judge should not deviate from an ideal of dispassionate adjudication. Another resolution recognises the difficulty of impartial judging when religion was at issue: that "I be not too rigid in matters conscientious, where all harm is diversity of judgement."
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It was a professional regimen for a judicial persona ideally capable of impersonal 5 detachment and impartial judgement. Hence the further rules: that "I never engage myself in the beginning of any cause, but reserve myself unprejudiced till the whole be heard"
and that "in business capital, though my nature prompts me to pity, yet to consider that there is also pity due the country." 12 In the circumstances, these resolutions are far from being unremarkable. At their heart is an incipient ethical separation: a neutral adjudication as is "due the country" must be something other than the pious faith that the believer owes to God.
To mark out the space of this separation was compatible with the Protestant doctrine that fallen man's imperfect capacities rendered spurious any human claim to know God's will and to cite the same as a matter of law. In this space, Hale thus draws a line against granting supremacy in civil matters to inner conscience, since this would "utterly enervate all the power of [the] magistrate, for [conscience] sets up in every particular subject a tribunal superior to that of the magistrate." 13 The danger is double:
not only would civil peace be threatened by those who claim to act in the name of an authority higher than the law of the civil sovereign; but also -as indicated by Hale's statement that "all harm is the diversity of judgement" -civil conflict is rendered the more likely because in circumstances of religious division no consensus is possible as to what the reasons and demands of the higher authority actually are.
On church ceremonies as dangerously divergent expressions of the religious impulsion, Hale's disposition was latitudinarian:
It is pitiful to see men make these mistakes; … one holding a great part of religion in pulling off the hat, and bowing at the name of Jesus; another judging a man an idolater for it; and a third placing his religion in putting 6 off his hat to no one; and so like a company of boys that blow bubbles out of a walnut shell shall every one run after his bubble and call it religion. If a man either by working upon the fancy of another, or possibly by harsh or unkind usage put another into such passion of grief or fear, that the party either die suddenly, or contract some disease, whereof he dies, tho as the circumstances of the case may, this may be murder or manslaughter in the sight of God, yet in foro humano it cannot come under the judgment of felony, because no external act of violence was offerd, whereof the common law can take notice, and secret things belong to God. 21 Older certainties were in the balance, rendering the present legal status of witchcraft and other "irreligious" actions uncertain. As Hale's ambivalence suggests, at this time the 8 demarcation between public crimes and private beliefs was not drawn in a recognisably modern manner. As a matter of private belief, witchcraft would not be the concern of secular legality, though known to God, the foro divino and inner conscience.
Witchcraft and heresy had stood in the same historical series: "Witchcraft, Sortilegium was by the antient laws of England of ecclesiastical cognizance, and upon conviction thereof without abjuration, or relapse after abjuration, was punishable with death by writ de haeretico comburendo." 22 In presenting the history, Hale's jurisdictional concern and confessional sensitivity are evident:
[The Papal canonists] have by ample and general terms extended heresy so far, and left so much in the discretion of the ordinary to determine it, that there is scarce any the smallest deviation from them, but it may be reduced to heresy, according to the general generality, latitude, and extent of their definitions and descriptions. 23 The story is being told so as to disinculpate the common law from a charge of complicity with religious persecution. Hale thus ends the chapter on religion in Historia placitorum coronae by recording that now, under Charles II, the writ of de haeretico and "all capital punishments in pursuance of ecclesiastical censures are utterly abolished and taken away, so that heresy is now punishable only by excommunication, … the civil effects of which are, that the party is disabled from making a will, or from suing for any debt or legacy." Martin Heckel has given us the remarkable legal history of a "non-confessional order of co-existence" and its achievement in the German Empire. 32 Robert von
Friedeburg underscores this achievement: by the mid-1600s, "assessment of licit government had been separated from scripture and relocated in an entirely legal realm of thought, based on a historical assessment of the German constitution." 33 Yet, as regards a judiciary independent of the sovereign power, Brandenburg was one state that had little or no place for any such institution. In comparison with the quasi-autonomous regime of 13 the English common-law judiciary, in Brandenburg there was no separation of political sovereign and judiciary, no division of powers insulating judge from legislator. Before we commoners protest, we must recognise that the Brandenburg establishment of absolute sovereignty proved one way of rendering religious differences politically -and juridically -irrelevant (or, at least, less relevant), thereby serving the cause of peaceful coexistence. What is more, the common law -in such a persona as the Tudor jurist, Christopher St German -was perfectly complicit with state absolutism insofar as this denied legitimacy to its rivals, papal and canonist jurisdictions, even as the political break with Rome freed up space for a quasi-autonomous native English law.
Whether or not the quasi-autonomy of the native common lawyers was -and is -a good thing has long been a matter of dispute. In the eyes of Thomas Hobbes, that
Frenchified English philosopher of civil science with a Gallic distrust of government by judiciary, 34 there was no doubt: an independent judiciary was an impediment to legislative sovereignty and thus part of the problem of civil conflict, not its solution. As for the common lawyers more generally, they were the "fascinators" and the provokers of disobedience. "The private priests of (legal) reason must be checked as the private priests of revelation needed to be checked" -such is the burden of Hobbes's Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England. 35 Faced with the Philosopher's charge that any man can "pretend within a Month, or two to make
[himself] able to perform the Office of a Judge", Hobbes's Lawyer says that such a man will make "an ill Pleader", a response that generates a pointed attack:
Philosopher: A Pleader commonly thinks he ought to say all he can for the Benefit of his Client, and therefore has need of a faculty to wrest the sense prove ineffectual, when they come to particular application. 39 If such "unerring systems" in fact err, this is because of "the greate difference in most of the States and Kingdomes in ye world in their Laws administrations and measures of right and wrong, when they come to particulars." 40 We can imagine a Hale who says: To turn to "reason" as law -no less than turning to private conscience -is therefore to risk the "Inconvenience of an Arbitrary." This, writes Hale, "is intollerable, and therefore a certaine Lawe, though accompanied by some mischiefe, is preferrable before it." But, he adds, "it is not possible for any humane thing to be wholly perfect." 43 The English common law is such a law. It has emerged not from some great theoretical elevation to a higher-order reason but as a "Production of long and Iterated Experience":
[I]t appears that men are not borne Common Lawyers, neither can the bare Exercise of the Faculty of Reason give a man a Sufficient Knowledge of it, but it must be gained by the habituateing and accustoming and
Exercising that Faculty by readeing, Study and observation to give a man a compleate Knowledge thereof. 44 Thanks to this in situ "habituateing" of the judicial persona, the historical kingdom has achieved the "Conservation of Laws within their boundes and Limitts." 45 In this way, peace and civil order have been preserved as best they could. You think it good enough to award the case to the one you think the worthy man, the better Christian, as though it were a question between parties of which was the better poet, orator, painter, worker -in the end a master of art, doctrine, valour or whatever 46 Hale, supra note 39, at 511. 47 Id. 48 Id., at 509. 49 Id., at 512. 50 Id. 
